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EXAMINING LONGWALL SHIELD FAILURES FROM AN ENGINEERING
DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
 By Thomas M. Barczak1
ABSTRACT
Longwall operators are again pushing the envelope in terms of life expectancy for longwall shields.  State-
of-the-art shields are now expected to last more than 60,000 loading cycles, twice the life expectancy compared
with those of a decade ago.  A review of trends in shield design shows that shields continue to increase in both
size and capacity.  Some state-of-the-art shields now weigh over 30 tons and provide up to 1,200 tons of
support capacity.  Although life expectancy has increased and modern shields are structurally more reliable,
premature failures do still occur.  This paper provides an engineering and operational assessment of shield
design and provides key points to observe in what causes premature shield failures.  Design practices to
improve structural margins of safety that will prevent premature failures from occurring are also examined.
A survey of recent shield failures is provided, as well as trends in shield design and how they might impact
the performance and longevity of a shield.  Hydraulic failures are more common than structural failures.
Although hydraulic failures occur on all aging longwall shields, they often go undetected for long periods,
resulting in degraded support capacity that can lead to serious ground control problems.  The fundamentals
of shield hydraulics are described in order to evaluate hydraulic failures that plague all shields at some point
in their service life, and practical methods to detect hydraulic failures are examined.  The paper concludes with
recommendations for inspecting damaged shields and safety precautions regarding their continued use.
1Research physicist, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
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INTRODUCTION
The decline in the number of longwalls from a high of 118
in 1985 to 62 in 1999 has forced a reduction in the number of
shield manufacturers through mergers from 8 to 2.  The two
major suppliers of shields to the U.S. market are Joy and DBT
America (formerly Mine Technik America or MTA).  Their
share of the market is split fairly evenly:  Joy has 32 faces and
DBT America has 30 faces [Fiscor 1999].  The author believes
that the merger of the shield manufacturers has been beneficial
to shield design in two ways.  First, the merger has allowed the
best of the U.K. shield designs (Joy) and the best of the German
designs (DBT America) to be brought forward.  By combining
the design strengths from each company, the result has been an
improvement in both structural design and control system
technology.  Second, the fierce competition during the decade
of the 1980s may have forced manufacturers to "cut corners"
relative to design in order to compete for sales, resulting in
deficiencies in design that led to premature structural failures
and less than adequate control technology.  Thus, while com-
petition is generally healthy, resulting in lower prices, there
needed to be a better balance of quality and price than existed
in the 1980s.  The hard reality is that shield manufacturers have
to make a profit in order to produce a quality product and to
stand behind this product with warranties; this capability was
jeopardized in the past and has been improved with the recent
mergers.
A survey of the longwall industry was conducted to evaluate
problems with current shield technology and future needs.  The
survey indicates that shields are lasting longer than ever before,
but that premature failures still occasionally occur and some
mistakes from the past continue to be made in recent shield
designs.  Structural failures tend to be the most catastrophic,
often requiring modifications to the original shield design.
These failures can cause considerable downtime and loss of
production, and expose the mine workers who must change out
the damaged components to increased risk of injury.  Hydraulic
failures are common to all aging supports.  These failures often
go undetected, resulting in degraded support performance that
can lead to serious ground control problems.  Methods to detect
these hydraulic failures are discussed later in this paper.
Due to the maturity of shield technology and the always
present economic pressures of the mining industry, longwall
operators are now keeping shields in service longer than ever
before.  In addition, due to the increases in longwall produc-
tivity, the number of operating cycles per year continues to
increase.  The result is that the operators are again pushing the
envelope in terms of extending the life expectancy of the
supports.  Today's shields are expected to last 60,000-70,000
cycles; 10 years ago the life expectancy was about 35,000
cycles.  Thus, while fatigue failures were not a design issue in
the early generation of shield supports, they have become
critical to the survival of most longwall operators in an ever
increasingly competitive market.  Much is being learned about
the behavior of aging shields, which are kept in service long
enough to fail from fatigue as opposed to failure from poor
design or replacement before the end of their useful life due to
technological improvements.
Deciding when to retire an aging longwall face and the
specifications for a new shield can be a critical decision for any
longwall operator.  Most mines do not have structural engineers
that can actively participate in these decisions.  An overview of
the fundamental engineering aspects of shield design is
provided in the paper, as well as key points that should be
considered in the design process to avoid premature structural
failures.  A primary goal of this paper is to provide mine op-
erators with a better sense of design issues and engineering
mechanics that are relevant to shield design.  The intent is not
necessarily to have the operators learn enough to know all the
answers, but to provide them with enough insight so they know
what questions to ask and what to look for relative to failures
that may occur.  These insights into shield design should also
be beneficial to the Mine Safety and Health Administration in
evaluating the safety of longwall shields.
The paper concludes with some practical recommendations
regarding what to look for and actions to take when failures do
occur.  These key points will help mine operators examine fail-
ures and provide responsible actions to ensure the safety of the
mine workers when shield performance is degraded.
RECENT TRENDS IN SHIELD DESIGN
The basic shield structure has remained unchanged for the
past 20 years (figure 1), although the structures have grown dra-
matically in size and capacity.  There have also been technolog-
ical improvements in electrohydraulic control systems that have
dramatically impacted the operation of the support.  Conse-
quences of these changes in shield design are discussed below.
MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS
The German shield companies (currently conglomerated
under DBT) have in recent years promoted the use of high-
strength steels (>100,000-psi yield) to minimize component
cross-sectional dimensions.  This trend continues in the present
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Figure 1.—Diagram of shield components.
Figure 2.—Trend showing increase in support capacity.
Figure 3.—Distribution of capacity for shields operating in 1999.
with both DBT and Joy Technologies.  High-strength steel
applications were first used in canopy structures to minimize
the cross-sectional thickness of the canopy in low- to moderate-
seam applications.  Today, high-strength steel in all shield de-
signs are necessary to provide the required strength for various
shield components in high-capacity designs.  Although the
added strength has helped to extend shield life, the high-
strength fabrications are more susceptible to brittle failure and
catastrophic fatigue failures.  Another consequence of some
high-strength steel applications is that special welding practices
are required (heat control, etc.), which makes underground
repairs more difficult.
CAPACITY
Support capacity has continued to increase throughout the
history of longwall mining.  This trend for the past 15 years is
shown in figure 2 [Fiscor 1999].  Average support capacities in
the United States have increased by nearly 50% since 1985 to
an average support capacity at yield of 768 tons for the 62
operating longwalls in the United States in 1999.  Twelve in-
stallations (19%) of the current longwalls employ shields with
capacities greater than 900 tons, and 19 installations (50%)
have capacities between 700 and 900 tons.  The current
distribution of shield capacities is shown in figure 3.  The
highest capacity shield used in the United States is 1,170 tons
[Fiscor 1999].  As shown in figure 2, maximum shield
capacities have evolved from 800-ton shields, which were
common from 1985 to 1990, to 1,200-ton shields in 1999.
The increase in capacity has significantly impacted shield
design and ground control capability.  In order to provide the
increased support capacity, larger diameter leg cylinders had to
be utilized.  One consequence of the larger diameter leg
cylinders has been a proportional increase in shield stiffness.
This increase means that the load developed in the support
structure will occur at less displacement or face convergence.
Although the increased stiffness may provide superior control
of the immediate roof, main roof weighting that causes
irresistible (in terms of the shield capacity) convergence on the
longwall face will result in greater shield loading with the
stiffer shield design.  As a result, it is not uncommon for the
high-capacity shields to be fully loaded to yield capacity just as
often as the lower capacity designs that they replaced.  An
example is illustrated in figure 4, where a 500-ton, 800-ton, and
1,000-ton shield are all fully loaded when 0.5 in of convergence
occurs.
Another consequence of the larger diameter leg cylinders is
that the leg socket must be designed to accept greater loads.
Historically, the leg socket has been a source for premature
shield failures, and the increased loading makes the design even
more demanding.  In addition, the larger diameter leg cylinders
require a wider and longer socket, which places further
demands on the design of the socket and load transfer to the
base and canopy structures.  In general, the larger diameter
cylinders have resulted in wider support components, which are
more susceptible to torsion loading than before.
Several models have been developed over the years to
determine support capacity requirements.  While these concepts
attempt to capture the support and strata interaction principles,
state-of-the-art shield capacities cannot be justified based on
these concepts.  A "bigger is better" attitude has prevailed,
which has been promoted by the manufacturers largely because
of the demands of mine operators to improve the life
expectancy of the shields.  Thus, it is the life expectancy issue,
along with ground control requirements, that have controlled
recent developments in longwall shield design and capacity
determinations.
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Figure 4.—Setting load and load developed due to 0.5 in of
roof movement for shields of various capacities.
SHIELD TYPE
There has been a steady increase in the use of two-leg
shields in favor of four-leg shields during the past decade, and
two-leg shields are becoming the favored support worldwide.
In 1997, 63 of the 65 longwall faces in the United States were
two-leg shield systems, compared to only 53% in 1985.  Larger
size hydraulic cylinders have been developed in recent years to
accommodate the increased demands for higher shield
capacities and have allowed these capacities to be realized with
two-leg designs that were not possible 10 years ago.
There are several consequences of the two-leg design.  From
a support strata interaction perspective, the two-leg shield
provides an active horizontal force toward the coal face due to
inclination of the leg cylinders.  This active horizontal force
improves overall strata stability by arresting slippage along
fracture planes or by preventing the expansion of highly jointed
or friable immediate roof geologies, which may be further
damaged by the front abutment loading.  In terms of the shield
loading, this increase in active horizontal loading also translates
into proportionally higher lemniscate link loading.  Historically,
lemniscate link pins and wear in bores have been a primary
cause of premature shield retirement and/or rebuild.  Thus, pin
diameters and bore areas need to be increased in higher capacity
shields to prevent this problem from becoming more prevalent.
Another issue related to the two-leg concept is higher contact
pressure on the canopy and base.  High toe loading, caused by
the moment created by the line of action of the resultant vertical
forces acting on the canopy and base, can be a problem in high-
capacity two-leg shields and should be considered in the
support design.  Base toe pressures of $600 psi can be expected
on high-capacity two-leg shields.  Base toe lifting devices are
now standard on most two-leg shields to assist in the
advancement of the shields, particularly in soft floor conditions.
There has also been a trend toward solid base designs to reduce
floor-bearing pressures in two-leg shields.
SIZE
In addition to wider shields required by larger diameter leg
cylinders, there is a trend toward wider shields to minimize
hydraulic cylinder maintenance and reduce the total cost by
employing fewer leg cylinders on a longwall face.  Again the
issue of torsion (twisting of canopy and base) is important in
designing wider shields.  It is not as easy as simply extending
the width of the canopy and base.  These components also need
to be strengthened for torsional loading.  Additionally, there is
the issue of weight.  The 2-m-wide designs may represent an
upper limit with current shield construction materials.  If high-
capacity designs are to prevail, then lighter weight materials
such as composites are likely to be needed to develop widths
much beyond 2 m.  The application of composite materials to
longwall shields is an area that has not yet been explored and
will require a whole new set of engineering requirements to im-
plement into shield design.  Although these materials offer sig-
nificant strength-to-weight ratio advantages, there are problems
regarding abrasion, pin-bearing areas where components rotate
relative to one another, torsion and shear stress control, and
costs.
In addition to increases in width, shields have increased in
length to accommodate one-web-back operations, larger face
conveyors, and deeper shearer webs.  Longer canopies and
bases create much larger bending moments that require stiffer
and stronger components than in previous generation supports.
The increase in length is largely responsible for the need for
greater shield capacity as the area of roof loading carried by the
shield increases or the greater convergence is seen by the canti-
levering of the immediate roof beam as the resultant shield
force moves further from the coal face.
SETTING FORCES
Setting forces have increased in proportion to the increase in
yield capacity because the size (diameter) of the leg cylinders
has increased to accommodate the higher yield capacities, while
the hydraulic setting pressures have remained constant in the
4,000- to 4,200-psi range.  This design practice, coupled with
the increased stiffness of the higher capacity supports, means
that the higher capacity shields are fully loaded as often as their
lower capacity predecessors (figure 4).
HYDRAULIC COMPONENTS AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS
Both Joy and DBT continue to make improvements in the
electrohydraulic control systems, making them more reliable,
more user-friendly, and easier to diagnose when problems
occur.  A description of these systems can be found in Barczak
et al. [1998].  Solenoid-operated valving systems are now
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becoming standard.  Spool valves have been shown to be
superior to ball-and-seat designs, which are prone to con-
tamination problems.  In addition, these systems allow the sole-
noid to be activated upon demand, unlike previous systems that
required the hydraulic feed to be interrupted by a control sole-
noid.  This leads to both quicker and smoother control of sup-
port functions.
HYDRAULIC EMULSIONS
For many years, longwall shields have utilized a water/
mineral oil emulsion as a hydraulic medium for the leg
cylinders.  The standard system has been a 5% oil/water emul-
sion.  There is a trend toward the use of synthetic fluids.  Most
western mines have now switched to "low-treatment" systems
with synthetic oils in concentrations of only 1% to 2%.  This
has largely been due to environmental issues imposed by the
Utah Department of Natural Resources.  Only one eastern mine
is currently using the low-treatment emulsion system.  Fazos,
Inc., (Australia) has experimented with an all-water system.
Although the synthetic oils are environmentally preferred,
they cost significantly more.  The synthetic concentrate is about
three to five times the cost of mineral oils.  Thus, despite the
lower concentration used in the low-treatment systems where
less than 2% oil is utilized, the overall cost is typically about
50% greater than high-treatment systems using 4% to 5%
mineral oil concentrations.  The major disadvantages of the
synthetic low-treatment system is that there is little room for
error.  A small drop in the oil concentration can lead to lubri-
cation and acidity problems.  Therefore, maintenance of the oil/
emulsion is much more critical than in the high-treatment
systems, where the oil content can be reduced from 5% to 4%
with little, if any, detrimental effects.  Bacteria growth can also
be accelerated in very low concentrations of oil emulsions,
which can cause more severe corrosion problems than if there
were no oil at all.
SUMMARY OF SHIELD FAILURES EXPERIENCED BY MINE OPERATORS
There have been numerous shield failures throughout the
history of the shield support.  A summary of these is provided
below.  Although failures have declined, particularly premature
failures that occur early in the shield life, there are still isolated
cases of premature failures.  Shields have a finite life, and
fatigue failures will eventually occur on all shields if left in
service long enough.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SHIELD FAILURES
Base Failures
Base failures seem to be the most prevalent and usually
occur from fatigue after the support has been in operation for
several panels of extraction.  A common failure mechanism is
when the leg socket casting breaks away from the base struc-
ture.  Formation of this failure is difficult to detect while the
support is in service, as the leg socket is housed deep inside the
base structure and this area usually is full of debris.  Once the
leg socket breaks loose, the support quickly becomes in-
operable.  The bottom plates of the base have insufficient
strength to withstand the leg forces, and the leg cylinder will
literally rip the base apart by tearing off the bottom plate.
Failure of the base structure (plates) can also occur without
the leg sockets failing.  The probable failure mechanism is
bending of the base.  This is more likely to occur in mine sites
that have very strong immediate floor strata.  In these hard floor
conditions, steps in the floor may be left by the shearer, as it is
difficult to maintain a constant height of extraction from cut to
cut.  The base structure is then simply supported in two
locations and is flexed as loading is applied.  Repeated flexure
causes the base to deform (plastically) or promotes fracture
from fatigue, which eventually results in failure of the base
structure.  In softer floor conditions, the strata deform to pro-
vide a fuller contact to the base.  This alleviates much of the
bending and reduces the risk of failure.  Standing the support on
the toe of the base can also result in damage of the base struc-
ture.  This configuration causes maximum stresses in the toe re-
gion, and the base will deform or fail usually where the cross
section is a minimum in the section of the base forward of the
leg connection.
Internally, the base structure is constructed with stiffeners
that hold the top and bottom plates apart to form a beam
arrangement, which gives the base its bending strength.  Cases
have been reported where these stiffeners have not been
properly welded in place or where the dimensional tolerances
were not within specifications.  In these cases, the stiffeners
broke loose and the base structures literally collapsed.  This
problem seems to be largely a matter of quality control, but it is
critical to support safety.  Since the stiffeners are hidden inside
the base structure, it is virtually impossible (excluding x-ray
inspection) to see these deficiencies prior to the failure.
Canopy Failures
Canopy structures are constructed of stiffened (top and
bottom) plates similar to base structures, and thus they are
susceptible to bending-induced failures as well.  Structurally,
canopies are less stiff than bases, which makes them more
susceptible to failure from bending than base structures.
However, while permanent deformation of the canopy is a fairly
common occurrence, destructions of canopies seem to be less
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Figure 5.—Age distribution of shields operating in 1999.
frequent than observed destructions of bases.  This suggests that
canopies are less often subjected to critical bending.  Three
reasons why canopies might avoid critical loading are:
(1) immediate roof strata are usually partially fractured, and full
contact with the canopy is more easily obtained, which min-
imizes bending moment; (2) tip loading on the canopy is
usually smaller than toe loading on the base since the resultant
force is more likely to be located near the toe of the base than
the near the tip of the canopy; and (3) the canopy surface area
is larger than the base area, which allows the canopy to
distribute load more efficiently.
Another common deformation of the canopy is "wrinkling"
of the top plate between the internal stiffeners.  This is due
probably to concentrated loading at locations between the
stiffeners, but might also be an indication of failure of the
weldments that hold the stiffeners in place.  If the stiffeners are
not secure, the plate may buckle from excessive stress that
results in bending of the plate between the more rigid stiffeners.
Caving Shield And Links
Link members have become considerably more robust in
shield designs over the past 10 years, and failures have been
substantially reduced.  Since the caving shield-link assembly
has very little vertical load capacity (stiffness), links are not
highly stressed for most load conditions.  Almost all link fail-
ures can be attributed to conditions or operating practices that
promote standing the support on the toe of the base or con-
ditions that cause large horizontal displacement of the canopy
relative to the base.
Failure of the structure is most likely to occur in the region
near the (pin) hole located on each end of the member.  The fail-
ure mechanism is most likely crack formation somewhere on the
circumference of the hole from localized high stress development.
The pinholes elongate from continued wear and contact with the
higher strength link pins.  This results in point loading of the pins
and high stress development at the contact areas.  These failures
are difficult to detect since this area is obscured from view by the
caving shield clevises or base structures.  Although link failures
are rare, they can be catastrophic, as the links provide horizontal
stability to the support structure.
Likewise, caving shield failures are fairly rare, but are more
likely to occur than link failures.  While links are designed pri-
marily for axial loading only, shield mechanics indicate the
primary loading mechanism for the caving shield is bending and
torsion.  Maximum stresses and failure are most likely to occur
in the clevis areas, where pins connect the link members to the
caving shield.  Some general yielding by bending deformation
of the caving shield structure may also occur.
Leg Cylinders
Assuming that the face area is sufficiently stable to prevent
bumps (violent outbursts of energy), it is unlikely that leg
cylinders will experience structural failure since they are de-
signed to control loading by hydraulically yielding at specified
pressures.  The most common failure associated with leg cyl-
inders is seal leakage.  Internal leakage may occur through other
sources, which will be discussed later in this paper.
Another potential failure mechanism for hydraulic leg
cylinders is malfunction of the yield valves, which allows leg
pressure to increase beyond design levels.  Usually, the ex-
cessive pressure will cause seal leakage, so that it is unlikely
that sufficient pressure will build up to rupture the cylinder
casing.  The more common problem is leakage through the
yield valve, which causes unplanned pressure losses during nor-
mal loading.  This leakage can be caused by dirt or contam-
ination not allowing the valve to seat properly or worn seats,
defective springs that maintain the valve in the closed position,
or the fitting itself may leak due to bad O-rings or seals.  
FAILURE ASSESSMENT OF SHIELDS CURRENTLY
IN SERVICE
Based on an informal survey at longwall mines, the age
distribution of the shields operating in 1999 is shown in fig-
ure 5.  The range of operating life extends from 0 to 14 years of
service.  An average shield operates about 4,000 cycles per
year; this translates into a face production of approximately
2.5 million tons per year.  Thus, an average 10-year-old shield
would have 40,000 loading cycles, whereas a shield employed
on a high-production longwall (4 million tons per year) would
have about 65,000 loading cycles.  Approximately one-third of
the shields have been in operation from 4 to 6 years (16,000-
24,000 cycles), and slightly more that than one-third (37%)
have been operating for more than 6 years (24,000 loading
cycles).
Figure 6 shows a near-linear increase in structural failures with
age.  Failure is defined as structural damage to any support com-
ponent.  It does not necessarily mean catastrophic failure that
renders the support inoperable.  The linear relationship suggests
that more than just fatigue failures are occurring, since
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Figure 6.—Distribution of structural and hydraulic failures on
shields as a function of age.
the frequency of fatigue failures should increase at a much greater
rate as the shield ages.  There were a wide range of structural
failures reported.  Most of the major failures involved either the leg
sockets or pin joint problems (i.e., lemniscate link pins and
clevises).  These two failures are most likely to put a shield out of
service and/or require structural modification to keep the support in
service.  Other structural failures occurred at areas of high stress
concentration, including the side shield on the canopy structure, the
canopy capsule tilt cylinder bracket, the base bridge, the link cutout
areas in the caving shield, various mounting brackets including the
pilot-operated/yield valve manifold, and dishing of canopy skin
covering plate.  There were a few isolated cases of leg cylinder
casing problems, but no catastrophic failures.
There were more hydraulic problems reported than structural
problems (figure 6), particularly in shields that have been in
operation less than 6 years.  There were nearly four times the
number of hydraulic failures in shields operating 3 years or less
and nearly twice as many for shields in the 4- to 6-year range than
there were structural failures for the same age group.  Obviously,
the weak link in shield design is the hydraulic system.  Numerous
hydraulic failures or problems were reported.  The high frequency
of failures in the first 3 years of operation is distorted by failure
of a component called a hydrafuse.  The hydrafuse is a safety
device incorporated by Joy as part of the leg cylinder design on
its recent generation of shield supports in response to a fatality
that occurred recently in Australia.  An Australian mine worker
was killed when the hydraulic fluid in the retract annulus of the
leg cylinders was inadvertently pressurized while setting the
support.  Normally, the retract port is open through the return line
back to the hydraulic reservoir whenever the leg cylinder is being
pressurized.  This is necessary since the pressure would be highly
intensified (by a factor 30 or more) if the port was blocked, as in
the case of the Australian fatality.  The resultant pressure
intensification caused the cylinder end cap to rupture, striking and
causing a fatal injury to the mine worker.
The hydrafuse is incorporated into the retract circuit and acts
as a yield valve to prevent the inadvertent buildup of pressure
in the retract annulus of the leg cylinder.  The design utilized by
Joy features a brass clip that shears off at a predetermined load
(hydraulic pressure).  Once the clip is broken, the "fuse" must be
replaced.  With a failure pressure of nearly twice the pump op-
erating pressure, it was expected that the fuse would provide the
desired safety on the rare occasions when there was abnormal
pressure and that replacement of the hydrafuse after the failure
would not be an inconvenience.  Surprisingly, hydrafuse failures
began occurring on several shields at several mines.  The failures
seemed to occur whenever the support had set idle for some time
and whenever the leg pressure was at or near yield pressure and
almost always on the top stage retract circuit.  The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducted
a series of tests on a longwall shield under of variety of loading
conditions in the Mine Roof Simulator to determine if unexpected
pressures were occurring in the retract circuit.  None were found.
Similar measurements of retract pressure on active shields in
underground mines that reported hydrafuse failures were taken by
Joy; again, no abnormal pressure spikes were found.  However,
it is believed that a water-hammer effect is being created by the
valve operation.  Joy has since installed a restricter valve in the
circuit to dampen out any potential pressure spike.  Early in-
dications from the field installations indicate that this may be
working to prevent the undesirable failure of the hydrafuses.
Unfortunately, the restricter also increases the time required to
lower the top stage.  Fortunately, in two-stage leg cylinder de-
signs, the bottom stage is lowered first, and lowering of the top
stage is only required when the bottom stage is fully collapsed.
Thus, the increased time to lower the top stage will not be a
problem during most production mining.
Other cylinder problems caused pressure losses that limited sup-
port capacity.  One example was due to poor fabrication where the
internal bore of the top stage was off center, resulting in a
weakened casing that was unable to sustain the pressure in-
tensification that occurred in the top stage.  Other problems were
reported with defective yield valves that would not reset, resulting
in the inability of the shield to adequately hold load after yielding.
Similar problems were reported with the staging valve, which also
caused loss of pressure in the leg cylinders at a few mines.  One
mine reported clearance problems with the leg cylinder and the
base rib plates where the cylinder leaned into the rib plates, causing
internal damage to the cylinder and seal leakage.  Failures also oc-
curred with the advance ram cylinders, including failure of shuttle
valve springs and structural failure of a hollow tube relay bar
design.
Most hydraulic problems are related to internal leakage due
to seal wear and/or corrosion of the cylinders.  These problems
typically begin when shields have been in service 4 to 6 yrs.  As
figure 6 shows, 60% of the shields had some sort of hydraulic
problems during this timeframe.  Many problems go undetected
for extended periods of time, resulting in degraded support ca-
pacity that can contribute to ground control problems in heavy
loading conditions.  Methods to detect the onset of internal
hydraulic leakages are discussed later in this paper.  As
previously described, there is a trend toward the use of low-
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treatment synthetic fluids in western U.S. mines.  One western
mine reported severe leg cylinder corrosion due to problems
with a low-treatment synthetic emulsion on shields that have
been in operation less than 3 years.
Problems with the electrohydraulic control systems were also
reported.  These included sticking solenoid valves (problem
with soaping in emulsion formulation) and chattering valves
due to fluid dynamics at high flows.  Most mines reported that
significant improvements have been made in the latest gen-
eration of electrohydraulic controls.  In particular, the DBT
(MTA) PM-4 system seems to be a significant improvement
over the previous PM-3 design.
ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT OF SHIELD DESIGN AND FACTORS THAT CAUSE
STRUCTURAL FAILURES
Structural failure can be divided into the following four basic
types:  (1) general yielding or excessive plastic deformation;
(2) buckling or general instability, either elastic or plastic;
(3) subcritical crack growth (fatigue, stress-corrosion, or
corrosion fatigue), leading to weakening of the component or
unstable crack growth; and (4) unstable crack extension, either
ductile or brittle, leading to either partial or complete failure of
a member.  Structural shield failures are generally of types 1
and 3 and occasionally type 4.  A better understanding of the
cause of these failures can be obtained by reviewing the
principles of engineering mechanics for structural design.
BASIC ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES
IN SHIELD DESIGN
Classical structural engineering design is based primarily on
a strength of materials approach.  The goal of this approach is
to define the load requirements for the structure and then to
proportion the sizes and shapes of the various components to
prevent tension failure or to prohibit instabilities such as
buckling in a compression failure.  Failure is prevented by em-
ploying safety factors to ensure that the allowable stress in
components remain within the elastic range of the strength of
the steel.  These basic engineering principles are used in current
shield design, except much higher allowable stresses are
permitted in shields compared to the safety factors employed in
the conventional design of structures, such as buildings and
bridges.  Failures by general yielding, such as that shown in
figure 7, indicate that shields have been designed without
sufficient margins of safety to prevent yielding.  This is in part
due to the low life expectancy of early-generation shield sup-
ports.  As the demands for greater life expectancy grew, the
manufacturers were forced to employ more conservative design
approaches.  However, even with state-of-the-art shields, it is
safe to say that the margins of safety may still remain below
that of conventional structural design where life expectancies
are much longer and failure of any sort is unacceptable.
Since the longwall face and shield supports are advanced
with each shearer cut, the shield is subjected to repetitive
loading and the potential for fatigue-related failures.  Fatigue is
the process of cumulative damage that is caused by repetitive
fluctuating loads.  Ductile as well as brittle materials are
susceptible to fatigue failures.  Since there is no large amount
of plastic deformation prior to the fatigue failure, even in
ductile materials, fatigue failures appear with little or no
warning.  The failure mechanism is considered to be quite
complex, but in general a fatigue crack is initiated at some
microscopic or macroscopic stress riser.  The crack itself then
acts as a stress riser to promote localized yielding in the vicinity
of the crack tip.  In general, the more severe the stress
concentration and the greater the load fluctuation, the shorter
the time to initiate a fatigue crack.  After a certain number of
load fluctuations, the accumulated damage causes propagation
of a crack or cracks, leading to failure of the structure.
Conventional structural design for things such as machines
and bridges employ relatively conservative design practices
relative to fatigue loading to ensure the desired life and safety of
the structures.  Typically, the fatigue (endurance) limit of conven-
tional steels is about 50% of the tensile (yield) strength.  Gen-
erally speaking, this means that the nominal load (stress)
developed in the shield components must be kept below 50% of
the yield strength to prevent fatigue failures from occurring,
thereby providing an indefinite life expectancy relative to fatigue
failure.  Such a design approach for shield supports would require
much larger component sizes, which would significantly increase
the weight of the shield and, as such, are considered impractical
for shield design.  As the stress is increased beyond this en-
durance limit, the number of cycles to failure is reduced, starting
at about 1 million load cycles.  For a life expectancy of 100,000
cycles, which is more representative for longwall shields, the
allowable stress to prevent fatigue failure is much closer to the
yield strength of the steel, suggesting that a factor of safety of 2
is not needed in shield design, at least in relation to fatigue issues.
Of course, these generalities are subject to the specific properties
of the steel and the support construction.  The allowable stress
may be considerably less in some circumstances.  For example,
the allowable stress to prevent fatigue failure for a plate welded
on the flange of an I-beam (similar to a plate welded on the
bottom of the base pontoon) is only 15 ksi [American Institute of
Steel Construction 1980].
In addition to fatigue, stress corrosion causes failures to
occur under statically applied loads with stress developments
well below the yield strength of the material and independent of
the number of load cycles.  This can account for structural
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Figure 7.—General yielding of toe of base unit in shield design
from early 1980s.
Figure 8.—Corrosion of a lemniscate link clevis.
Figure 9.—Fracture mechanics principles regarding material
toughness, stress, and flaw size.
failures that occur at low-production mines with aging shields
where the number of cycles is low, but the age is high.  In other
words, a shield does not necessarily have to have many cycles
to fail.  The failure occurs due to crack initiation caused by the
corrosion and subsequent propagation of this crack or material
defects similar to those observed for fatigue loading.  The
author believes that stress corrosion is a significant and the
most overlooked factor in current shield design.  The mine
environment is often wet and acidic, which accelerates cor-
rosion of shield components, as shown in figure 8.  The base
units in particular are subjected to extensive corrosion since the
wet debris continually forms around and often covers much of
the base structure.  An area of particular concern is the leg sock-
et, which collects rock and coal debris throughout much of the
shield's operating life.  When combined with fatigue loading
(corrosion-fatigue), stress corrosion causes a further reduction
in the useful life of the longwall shield.  Corrosion-fatigue dam-
age occurs more rapidly than would be expected from the in-
dividual effects or from the algebraic sum of the individual
effects of fatigue, corrosion, or stress-corrosion cracking.
The science of fracture mechanics was developed during
1946-66 to analyze unexplained failures in several large-scale
complex structures where brittle fractures were observed at stress
levels no larger than were expected when the structure was
designed [Barsom and Rolfe 1987].  The underlying premise in
fracture mechanics is that real structures contain numerous
discontinuities of some kind.  These discontinuities can be flaws
in weldments, poor fabrication practices where torch cutting
leaves surface scars and abrasions, or cracks in base or weld
materials due to factors like corrosion.  These discontinuities act
as stress risers, and unstable, rapid fracturing occurs when the
stress intensity factor at the crack tip reaches a critical value.
Such discontinuities certainly exist in longwall shields and are
undoubtedly a primary source of structural failures.
The goal in fracture mechanics design is to keep the stress
intensity level below the critical value that promotes crack
propagation (figure 9), much like the goal of strength of
materials design is to keep the design stress within the
material's elastic range.  To ensure that a structure does not fail
by fracture, the number of cycles to grow a small (often
microscopic) crack to a critical crack length must be greater
than the life of the structure.  Thus, the key idea to consider in
a fracture mechanics design is the ability of the steel to absorb
strain energy.  If the material has a high absorption capability,
such as mild steel, crack growth will be limited to plastic flow
of the material, and general yielding will typically prevent
brittle fractures from occurring.  Conversely, the probability of
fatigue-related failures increases with low-energy absorption
materials.  Unfortunately, from a fracture mechanics perspec-
tive, state-of-the-art shields are now constructed from high-
strength steels (100,000- to 120,000-psi yield strength), which
are much more susceptible to brittle fracture than the early
generation of shield supports, which were constructed from
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Figure 10.—Reduction in lemniscate pin contact area for worn joint.
Figure 11.—Racking of pin joint.
mild steel (35,000- to 45,000-psi yield strength).  The mo-
tivation for the high-strength steel, of course, is to minimize the
size of the components and keep the weight of the shield down,
which is an ever increasing challenge for the design engineers
as the capacity of the shields continue to rise.  In essence, the
term high-strength steel is a misnomer for two reasons.  First,
the fracture toughness is reduced, which means that the
allowable stress, as a percent of the yield strength, must also be
reduced to prevent fracture from occurring.  In other words, the
full advantage of increased strength of the steel may not be
realized.  Second, unlike lower strength steels where the weld
material is of equivalent or higher strength of the base metal, it
is not uncommon for weaker weld materials to be used in the
high-strength steel constructions.
DESIGN PRACTICES TO IMPROVE STRUCTURAL
MARGINS OF SAFETY AND EXTEND SHIELD LIFE
Since most structural shield failures can be attributed to
some form of fracture, the basic elements of fracture control can
significantly improve shield life.  These are:  (1) use a lower
design stress, (2) minimize stress concentrations, (3) reduce
flaw size or control crack growth, (4) minimize corrosion, and
(5) use materials of improved toughness. 
Lower Design Stress
Some margin of safety should be employed in the design
stress relative to the yield strength of the steel.  Civil engineers
typically use a factor of 1.66, which means that the allowable
stress is about 60% of the yield stress for nonfatigue loading
and further reduced by 50% or more when fatigue loading
applies.  While these levels of safety are not practical in shield
design due primarily to cost and weight limitations, it is
important to recognize that a small reduction in (tensile) stress
developments will significantly reduce crack growth since the
two are related by an exponential function.  Past practices of
designing to or near yield strength should be avoided in modern
shield design where the life expectancy exceeds 50,000 loading
cycles.
Link pins and clevises are a prime example of historically
poor design practices in shield supports, which continue even
today.  Deformation and/or excessive wear in the pin clevises
is undoubtedly the primary cause of premature shield retirement
and/or structural rebuild.  There are clear indications that these
areas are subjected to stress beyond the yield strength of the
steel.  This poor design is caused partly by manufacturers not
giving sufficient credence to the conditions that cause high
loading in the caving shield-lemniscate assembly, namely, loss
of frictional contact at the roof and floor interface and standing
the support on the toe of the base.  With the possible exception
of shields designed for low-seam heights, there is adequate
space available to increase the bearing area of these clevises and
pin diameters to reduce the stress and substantially improve the
life expectancy of these components.  The joint design problem
also needs to recognize the importance of pin tolerance.  First,
the pin contacts only a portion of the clevis.  Typically, arcs of
45E to 60E are used in the design analysis.  Obviously, the 45E
arc assumption will lead to more conservative designs.
Conservative assumptions should be made to allow for reduced
areas as wear occurs (figure 10).  Excessive pin tolerances can
lead to point loading by allowing the pin to rack within the joint
clevis, as shown in figure 11.  Corrosion effects are also often
ignored or not sufficiently accounted for in the design of pins,
despite the fact that corrosion is a leading cause of premature
pin failures or abnormal wear.  Corrosion causes pits to occur
in both the pins and clevises (figure 8), which can reduce the
bearing area by 25% to 50% and cause a proportional increase
in stress.
233
Figure 12.—Modification made to strengthen base in order to
prevent leg socket casting failures.
Several failures have occurred where the leg socket casting
weldments break because of fatigue or stress-corrosion and there-
by cause failure of the bottom base plate as the loading is trans-
ferred fully to the bottom plate instead of being distributed to the
side rib plates.  Most of the time, the leg cylinder and casting
punch through the bottom plate and into the mine floor, rendering
the support inoperable.  A common modification to alleviate base
leg socket failures of this nature is to add another plate to the
underside of the base pontoon, as shown in figure 12.  Typically,
this plate is about 1 in thick and usually covers most of the length
of the base pontoon.  Reinforcement is also typically added to the
top area of the side base plate.  While this plate stiffens the side
plate, its primary purpose is to restore the location of the
centroidal axis, which was changed by the addition of the bottom
plate, to its location in the original base design.  Because of past
failures of this nature, support manufacturers are now beginning
to incorporate a thicker bottom plate in the initial shield design.
Some mines have successfully reduced operating stress
levels by derating the shield support before underground in-
stallation.  The derating is accomplished by installing yield
valves with a lower operating pressure than specified in the
design.  Since the leg capacity controls the maximum load de-
velopments within the support, lower leg loads translate into
reduced component loading.  For example, if a 1,000-ton shield
support is derated by 10% to a 900-ton capacity, the margin of
safety relative to the tolerable crack size that will prevent
fatigue fracture may increase by 20% to 30%.
Minimizing Stress Concentrations
There are numerous sources of stress concentrations in long-
wall shield supports.  The most common is a change in ge-
ometry.  These stress concentrations should be identified and
their magnitudes quantified during the design and performance
testing phase.  One way to do this is to use photoelastic plastics.
The photoelastic plastic can be applied to almost any area of the
shield structure.  Colored fringes will appear on the plastic
when observed through a polarized lens that correlate to the
stress profiles.  Stress intensity factors of 2 to 3 are not un-
common for sharp changes in geometry, such as holes or sharp
bends in structural members.
One example of a sharp change in geometry is a lemniscate
link design with offset pinholes, as shown in figure 13.  This
link design is typically employed on a shield with a low profile
designed for operation in low-coal seams.  The bend is nec-
essary to provide clearance with the caving shield in the
collapsed or low operating height.  Lemniscate links are pri-
marily axially loaded members, but the offset pinhole geometry
induces additional stresses due to bending and thereby sig-
nificantly reduces the margin of safety for this component.
Figure 13 depicts failure of a bottom lemniscate link on a 620-
ton Westfalia shield that occurred during performance testing
at NIOSH's Safety Structures Testing Laboratory.  Although the
shield had 45,000 load cycles from underground service before
testing, a new link was installed on the shield that was
performance tested in the laboratory.  This was a new link
design that was fabricated for the mine by an outside vendor
(not the support manufacturer).  Failure occurred after only
14,000 loading cycles.  This failure illustrates two problems.
First, the design (allowable stress) was too high.  Test results
revealed that the nominal stress in the link exceeded 90% of the
material yield strength.  In addition, it appeared that the link
side plates had been torch cut, adding an additional stress riser
to the already sharp change in geometry at the bend in the link
in the area where the failure occurred.  These two factors re-
sulted in an unacceptable time to failure.  Figure 14 illustrates
another problem where the fabrication process left large flaws
that led to premature fatigue failure of the base rib.  This
problem may have been alleviated if the surface had been
smoothed to remove most of the surface flaws.
Any hole in a structural plate is another area where stress is
concentrated.  The structural components of a longwall shield
(canopy, caving shield, lemniscate links, and base) are connected
by a pin and clevis arrangement.  These areas are also sources of
stress concentration and fatigue failures on aging longwall shields
(figure 15).  Another example of a stress concentration caused by
a sharp change in geometry is shown in figure 16.  Holes are
sometimes cut into the canopy or caving shield structure to
accommodate the placement of hydraulic hoses.  In the example
shown in figure 16, failure occurred at the stress riser caused by
the sharp corner in a cutout on the caving shield made to
accommodate hosing for the side shield.  The best solution to this
problem is to avoid the hole altogether, and if the hole is
necessary, to ensure that the corner radius is as large as possible.
Another example of failure due to stress risers created by sharp
geometries is shown in figure 17, where a crack developed in the
caving shield near the canopy hinge.  A clean-out hole is often
placed in the side of the base structure to facilitate removal of
debris from the leg socket area.  This too can be a source for con-
centration of stress.  Since this is a critically loaded area of the
base, care should be taken in the design to minimize the stress
concentration by a incorporating a favorable geometry and orien-
tation with respect to the stress field in this member.
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Figure 13.—Failure of bottom lemniscate link.
Figure 14.—Failure of base rib side plate where fabrication
process left large flaws.
Figure 15.—Failure in base lemniscate link clevis.
Figure 16.—Failure due to stress concentrations in cutout
sections of caving shield.
Figure 17.—Failures of caving shield due to stress concen-
tration in sharp corners where lemniscate links connect.
Figure 18 shows failure of a canopy leg socket casting due
to a stress riser created by a sharp change in geometry.  The
failure in this case occurred in the casting itself.  This failure
occurred on several shield supports in the late 1980s, all of
which used this same basic socket design.  Again, this failure
probably could have been prevented by a smoother geometry.
Leg sockets are often a source of fatigue failures in aging
longwall shields.  The leg socket is a critical area since the full
load developed within the hydraulic leg cylinder must be
transferred into the canopy and base structures to be distributed
to the mine roof and floor.  An examination of the structural
mechanics associated with these base socket failures has led to
some other design changes that are intended to reduce the stress
concentration in the leg socket casting/base structure con-
nection.  The rectangular geometry of the socket casting and its
placement between the side rib plates of the base structure
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Figure 18.—Failure due to stress riser created by sharp corner
in canopy leg socket casting.
Figure 19.—"Zipper-shaped" leg cylinder casting to avoid
stress concentration caused by orientation of casting to principal
stress field.
position it at right angles to the principal tensile stress caused by
the bending of the base structure.  This orientation creates a stress
intensity factor, which helps to promote fatigue-induced frac-
turing of the weldment.  Some shields are now being designed
with an elliptical or zipper-shaped casting (figure 19) so that the
front and/or rear edge is not perpendicular to the principal tensile
stress, thereby resulting in a reduction of the stress intensity
factor.
Reducing Flaw Size or Controlling Crack Growth
Weldments are an essential part of the shield fabrication process.
However, since weldments are a primary source of structural flaws,
the quality of the welds is critical.  As the principles of fracture
mechanics illustrate, the initial flaw size created by the welding
process is critical to the crack propagation and the margin of safety
achieved in this structure.  Once a crack develops, it is desirable to
keep the crack contained within the weld and not have it progress
to the base material adjacent to the weld.  This action may depend
on the nature of the heat-affected zone in the immediate vicinity of
the weld.  In general, the heat-affected zone results in anisotropic
material properties and residual stresses that tend to reduce the
toughness of the steel in this area and increase the likelihood of
fracture into the base metal.  For the high-strength steels used in
modern shield supports, proper heating and cooling of the steel
during the weldment process are crucial to preventing crack
initiation and growth in the heat-affected zone.  This is why it is
very difficult to conduct repairs to damaged shields underground,
since it is virtually impossible to be able to preheat and properly
cool the steel when welding at the longwall face.  Another approach
that can be used to keep crack growth contained to the weldments
is to create breaks in the weldments.  This practice is sometimes
used in leg socket castings.  The break in the weld at the corners of
the casting acts like as a crack arrester to stop the growth of the
crack.  This same technique is used in the airplane industry by
drilling holes in the metal at the end of an observed crack before it
reaches a critical crack length.
Perhaps the best approach to avoid problems associated with
weldments is to eliminate them when possible.  A good exam-
ple of this pertains to the leg socket design.  A typical con-
struction for the leg cylinder base socket is shown in figure 20.
A casting 3-4 in thick and 18-24 in long with a spherical seat to
accommodate the bottom of the hydraulic cylinder is placed on
top of the bottom cover plate on the base pontoon and is welded
in place along the four sides of the top of the casting to the side
rib plates and cross plates that connect the two side base plates
together.  This design is highly dependent on the welds to
transfer load into the side rib plates and maintain the structural
integrity of the socket connection.  An alternative design that is
now being used in some canopy leg sockets to alleviate the
weld fatigue problem is to cut rectangular holes into the side
base rib plates and extend the width of the casting so that it
bridges across the cylinder opening, but is supported by the side
rib plates (figure 20).  In this configuration, leg cylinder loading
is transferred directly to the side rib plates of the base structure
entirely through base metal contact and is not dependent on the
weldments to achieve this load transfer.
Corrosion Control
Some steps can be taken to circumvent the problems caused
by corrosion.  The most convenient approach is to try to protect
the shield from the environment.  For shield supports, this ap-
plies mostly to painting with an industrial paint that is resistant
to the wet mine environment.  However, for some components
such as the pins and clevises where there is considerable wear
due to the kinematics of the shield during load application,
painting or even plating with more resistant material is not an
option.  Sherardizing pins has proven beneficial, but the effec-
tiveness is limited due to the wear in the joint.  Another option
worth considering is some form of lubrication for these joints.
A simple grease fitting would be an improvement, although
somewhat impractical to maintain on an active longwall face.
Thus, a sealed joint of some form would be preferable.
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Figure 20.–Conventional and alternative leg cylinder casting
design.
Tests have shown that compressive stresses on the surface of
materials that are exposed to the environment will not
necessarily minimize corrosion-fatigue crack initiation, but they
can reduce the possibility of crack growth and thereby prevent
failure from occurring.  This could be done by induction
hardening the joint pins.  This, however, might make the pins
more brittle.
Material Toughness
The strength of materials approach essentially ignores the
toughness of the material, which as described is the most
significant material property for fracture control.  There is a
tradeoff in the use of high-strength steels if they provide
superior strength but reduced toughness with greater chance for
failure.  Since the author is not familiar with the German and
U.K. steels used in the shield construction, no specific
recommendations are made here, but the issue should be
investigated with the shield manufacturer when new shields are
purchased.
 KEY POINTS IN EVALUATING HYDRAULIC FAILURES
As described earlier, hydraulic failures are common on
aging longwall shields.  Although hydraulic failures are
generally not as catastrophic as structural failures, they cause
a reduction in supporting capability that can lead to serious
ground control problems.
FUNDAMENTALS OF SHIELD HYDRAULICS
Hydraulic Cylinder Operation
Since the capacity of a shield is controlled by the hydraulic
leg cylinders, a basic understanding of their operation is
essential to understanding shield design and causes of hydraulic
failures [Barczak and Gearhart 1998].  The basic operation of
a hydraulic cylinder can be described as follows (see figure 21).
A hydraulic power supply pumps fluid into the cylinder cavity.
The fluid acts against a piston, causing the piston and attached
steel rod to displace outward.  This displacement will continue
with very little hydraulic pressure until the support is set
against the mine roof and floor.  The hydraulic pressure then
increases rapidly until the full pump pressure is reached.  After
the pump supply is turned off or isolated from the support, this
pressurized hydraulic fluid is trapped inside the cylinder by a
pilot-operated check valve.  The pressure of the hydraulic fluid
inside the cylinder is then intensified in proportion to any
increase in roof loading.  A yield valve limits the maximum
pressure inside the cylinder to prevent excessive loading that
would damage the cylinder.  In longwall shields the cylinders
are double acting, which means that they are hydraulically
powered to both extend and retract (figure 21).  Powered
lowering of the support is achieved by pumping fluid inside the
retract annulus (figure 21) while at the same time applying pilot
pressure to open the check valve to allow fluid from inside the
main cylinder cavity that supports the weight of the mine roof
to escape back to the hydraulic power supply tank.
The previous example describes the basic operation of a
single-stage cylinder, where extension and retraction is pro-
vided by one stage.  Longwall shields utilize two-stage hy-
draulic cylinders, as shown in figure 22.  Incorporating more
stages into a leg cylinder design generally allows for a lower
collapsed height, combined with an equal or greater maximum
working height to provide operation in a wider range of mining
heights.
The basic operating principles of these multistage designs
are the same as the single-stage hydraulic cylinder previously
described, but there are some noteworthy differences relative to
how the individual stages perform:
1. The bottom stage extends and retracts first, followed by
the top stage.  The bottom stage will extend until it is fully
stroked before the top stage will begin to extend.
2. A check valve is installed in the bottom-stage piston
(figure 22).  This check valve functions to allow hydraulic fluid
to flow from the bottom stage to the top stage to cause the top
stage to extend during the setting operation whenever the
bottom stage is fully extended.  It also isolates the bottom stage
from the top stage to allow the hydraulic fluid to be intensified
in the top stage once the support is actively set against the mine
roof and floor.  This is necessary to allow the top stage to carry
the same load as the bottom stage.
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Figure 21.—Functional diagram of hydraulic cylinder operation.
Figure 17.—Failures of caving shield due to stress
concentration in sharp corners where lemniscate links
connect.
Understanding how the staging functions to provide the
necessary support capacity is critical to a proper understanding
of multistage leg cylinder operation.  For proper operation of
the support to occur, force equilibrium must be satisfied for
each stage, which means that each stage must carry the same
load.  This requires different hydraulic pressures in each stage,
since the area of each stage is different.  Mathematically, this
requirement is expressed by equation 1.  If the top stage area is
one-half that of the bottom stage area, the pressure in the top
stage will be twice that of the hydraulic fluid in the bottom
stage.
A1 ( P1 ' A2 ( P2, (1)
where A1 ' area of largest diameter (bottom) stage, in
2;
P1 ' pressure in largest diameter (bottom) stage, psi;
A2 ' area of the top stage, in
2; and
P2 ' pressure in the top stage, psi;
The extension of specific stages at a particular point in time
(cycles of operation) depends on the history of the operating
heights of the support.  When the support is initially raised from
a fully collapsed position, the bottom stage will extend first.  If
the mining height is greater than the stroke of the first stage, the
top stage will extend until roof contact is made.  On subsequent
cycles, the top stage will remain at the initial extension until
(1) the mining height is increased beyond that of the initial
cycle, or (2) the support is lowered such that the bottom stage
is fully collapsed.  Assuming that the support is not lowered to
the point where the bottom stage is fully collapsed, the top stage
will extend beyond the initial extension only when the mining
height is increased.  In essence, the bottom stage will be fully
stroked (1) when the support is initially raised from a collapsed
position and (2) on the mining cycle that establishes a new
maximum operating height, whenever the support height is
higher than it has been on all previous mining cycles.  On all
other cycles, the bottom-stage extension will reflect changes in
mining height relative to the initial mining height and the
maximum operating height at which the support was utilized.
An example is used to illustrate these concepts.  As shown
in figure 23, the initial setting of the support causes the bottom
stage to be fully extended 24 in (stroke) and a 12-in (partial)
extension of the top stage.  If the roof-to-floor mining height is
reduced on the second operating cycle by 3 in, the bottom-stage
extension now will be 21 in, while the top-stage extension will
remain at 12 in.  If the mining height is increased by 6 in from
that of the second cycle, the bottom stage will again be fully
extended (24-in stroke) and the second-stage extension will
increase to 15 in on the third cycle.  This exercise can continue
as shown in figure 23.  As shown in this exercise, the top-stage
extension on any cycle will equal the initial extension plus the
incremental increase in mining height beyond the initial mining
height.  The top-stage extension will never be less than the
initial extension unless the support is lowered to the point
where the bottom stage is fully retracted.  The bottom-stage
extension will fluctuate with changes in mining height on each
cycle and will be fully stroked whenever a new maximum
operating height is attained.
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Figure 23.—Example of stage extension for changes in mining height.
Active (Setting) Loads
The shield is actively set against the mine roof and floor by
pressurizing the hydraulic cylinders.  The force exerted against
the mine roof and floor is dependent upon the size of the
cylinder and the hydraulic (pump) pressure.  In multistage
cylinders, the setting force can be determined by measuring the
pressure in any stage and multiplying it by the (piston) area of
that stage.  It is important to remember that the pressure in the
top stage is intensified during the setting operation, and only the
bottom stage will be at pump pressure once the support is set
(assuming that none of the stages are fully stroked).  In long-
wall shields, the hydraulic pressure is measured only in the
bottom stage; thus, the pump pressure times the bottom stage
area should be used to calculate the setting force.  The total
setting force for the support is simply the sum of individual
hydraulic cylinder forces.
If the bottom stage is fully stroked, the setting force will be
diminished.  When the bottom stage that is fully extended no
longer transfers all of its force to the mine roof and floor, part
of it is consumed by tensioning the cylinder casing as the piston
is forced against the mechanical stops that limit its travel.  The
pressure in the top stage will not be intensified, but instead will
be at pump pressure.  The setting force will always equal the
pump pressure times the area of the largest diameter stage that
is not fully extended.  Thus, the setting force will equal the
pump pressure times the top stage area whenever the bottom
stage is fully extended.
The reductions in setting force due to full extension of the
bottom stages are typically between 40% and 50% for most
shield designs.  Thus, a 1,000-ton shield with a setting load of
670 tons at 4,200-psi pump pressure would have a setting force
of only 268 to 335 tons when the bottom stage is fully
extended.  Recalling the operation of the hydraulic cylinder
previously described, the setting force will be diminished
whenever the bottom stage is fully extended, which occurs on
the operational cycle where a new maximum operating height
is attained.  The setting force will be restored to its full capa-
bility on all other cycles or whenever the support is operated at
a height less than the highest operating height on any previous
operating cycle.
Yielding Behavior
Yield valves are normally connected to the bottom stage of
multistage hydraulic cylinders to provide overload protection.
These valves open whenever the pressure exceeds the design
threshold and allow the pressurized fluid to escape from the
bottom stage of the cylinder.  This loss of fluid causes the
pressure to drop in the bottom stage until the valve reseats.  The
reseating pressure is typically about 90% of the yield pressure;
thus, the support capacity will drop by approximately 10%
when the yield valve opens.  As the pressure drops in the bot-
tom stage, a force imbalance occurs between the top and bottom
stage, which causes the bottom stage to lower until force
equilibrium is attained.  The top-stage extension does not
change during yielding until the bottom stage is fully collapsed.
How much the bottom stage lowers because of yielding
depends on three factors:  (1) the area of the bottom stage, (2) the
extension of the bottom stage, and (3) the yield pressure and
reseating pressure of the yield valve.  The reduction in support
height due to yielding will be more for large extensions of the
bottom stage than for small extensions of the bottom stage,
decreasing in direct proportion to reductions in the bottom-stage
extension at the time of yielding.  Thus, on each successive yield-
ing during any one operating cycle, the lowering of the bottom
stage will be progressively less.  The magnitude of bottom-stage
lowering due to yielding can be calculated using equations 2 and
3.  Using a 700-ton longwall shield with a bottom-stage diameter
of 11.8 in and a yield pressure of 6,389 psi as an example, the
bottom stage of each hydraulic cylinder will drop approximately
0.028 in during a single yield event if the bottom stage was
extended 14 in when yielding began.  A 70-ton reduction in










where ∆V ' change in volume of fluid in bottom stage of
  cylinder, in3;
∆P ' change in hydraulic pressure in bottom stage of
  cylinder, psi;
∆P ' yield pressure minus reseating pressure, psi;
V ' volume of fluid in bottom stage at time of
  yielding, in3;
V ' area of bottom stage times extension of bottom
  stage, in3; and
β ' bulk modulus of oil, psi (i.e., 320,000 psi).
where ∆D ' reduction in bottom-stage extension due to
   yielding, in;
∆V ' reduction in volume of fluid in bottom stage
  due to yielding, in3; and
A ' area of bottom stage, in2.
DETECTION OF HYDRAULIC FAILURES
It is important to realize that all shields will experience
leakages due to seal wear and/or component failures several
times during their life expectancy in the mine.  Also, many of
these failures will go undetected for extended periods of time,
resulting in significantly degraded shield capacity and ground
control capability.  Furthermore, if shield life is to be maxi-
mized, then recognition and correction of hydraulic failures are
important.  If both leg cylinders are not functioning properly,
eccentric loading in the canopy and caving shield-lemniscate
assembly, for example, will be created, causing increased
probability of structural failure in these components.  Addition-
al loading may be transferred onto adjacent shields, thereby
reducing their life expectancy.  Degraded support capacity may
induce more severe weighting of the shields, creating a
snowball effect that further degrades the support capability.
Observations of the relative positions of the cylinder staging
can be used to identify cylinder problems and the cause of
hydraulic leakages.  One indication of internal leakages is when
the bottom stage is consistently fully extended.  The bottom
stage should be fully extended only on operating cycles that
establish a new maximum operating height.  Thus, on the ma-
jority of operating cycles, the bottom stage should not be at full
extension.  Another indication of hydraulic leakage is when
there is a large difference in stage extensions of leg cylinders on
the same support (figure 24).  Observation of the bottom-stage
position can help to identify the component failure (table 1).




Staging check valve . . . . . . . . Up.
First-stage seals . . . . . . . . . . . Down.
Second-stage seals . . . . . . . . . Up.
Pilot-operated check valve . . . Down.
Yield valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Down.
Problems with the staging check valve can be isolated by
fully collapsing the shield and monitoring the leg pressures on
the operating cycle after the support is reset against the mine
roof and floor.  The requirement is to have the bottom stage
fully extended when the support is reset.  In this configuration
with a staging check valve that is functioning properly, the
pressure in the bottom stage will not change significantly until
the force in the top stage due to additional roof loading
overcomes the setting force developed in the bottom stage
(figure 25).  An immediate increase in pressure in the bottom
stage indicates that the check valve is leaking sufficiently to not
allow the pressure in the top stage to be intensified.
Two factors that reduce hydraulic life expectancy are
contamination and corrosion.  It is very important to change
filters as needed to maintain a clean emulsion.  Debris in the leg
cylinder is a leading cause of stage valves failures, which
reduce shield capacity by 40% to 60%.  Debris also reduces
seal life and can cause check valves and yield valves to mal-
function.  Corrosion is also a primary factor in leg cylinder life.
A chemical analysis of the emulsion fluid should be done
periodically.  Bacteria growth or poor water quality can signif-
icantly reduce the life of the leg cylinders.
From the design and repair perspective, there have been
improvements in plating technology, which has reduced the
corrosion problem in recent years.  Early shield designs used
chrome plating for the leg cylinder bores.  Chrome is a very
porous material, and even if the thickness is increased, the
structure, which is analogous to placing layers of chicken wire
on top of each other, remains quite porous.  Bronze is a much
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Figure 25.–Identification of defective leg cylinder staging valve.
bronze.  The harder the bronze is, the better the life that can be
expected.  An alternative to bronze is to use chrome over top of
nickel plating.  The electrolysis of the nickel creates a very hard
material that is highly corrosion-resistant, but the process is also
considerably more expensive.  Another problem with using
nickel as the base metal in the plating process is that the two
metals tend to react with one another, reducing the bond be-
tween them, which causes the chrome to peel off in time. 
An impending problem with current plating technology are
the environmental hazards associated with the plating process.
Both chrome and bronze plating present environmental hazards
that are likely to drive up the cost of these conventional plating
methods in the near future.  Since rebuilding of shield leg cyl-
inders is a routine part of extended shield operation on every
longwall, this can have a significant impact on the mining in-
dustry, and new plating technologies need to be explored.
Swanson Plating, Morgantown, WV, is now offering laser-con-
trolled plating as an alternative.  The laser technology, in addi-
tion to being more environmentally friendly, reduces the heat
affected zone by nearly two orders of magnitude and allows for
much more controlled plating using materials that cannot be
applied by conventional plating practices.  More innovative so-
lutions to consider would be the use of ceramic or composite
materials that are much more corrosion-resistant than the heavy
metals currently used in cylinder construction.
ERRORS IN ASSESSING SUPPORT LOADING
Support loading is determined from measurement of the
pressure in the bottom stage of the hydraulic cylinder.  Since
the pressure increases in direct proportion to the increase in
support loading, this provides an accurate assessment of the
roof loading through the full loading cycle.  However, when the
bottom stage is fully stroked, a portion of the increase in roof
loading after the support is set against the mine roof and floor
will not be detected by changes in hydraulic pressure in the
bottom stage.  The reason for this period of undetected roof
loading is that when the bottom stage is fully extended, the
bottom-stage piston is being held against the mechanical stops
with a force exerted by the pump pressure at the time the
support was set.  The pressure in the bottom stage will only
increase when this piston is moved off of the stops and begins
to compress the hydraulic fluid in the bottom stage.  In order for
this to happen, the pressure in the upper stage, which is at pump
pressure when the support is set, must increase to cause a force
in the upper stage that exceeds the setting force in the bottom
stage.  The additional roof loading that is required to produce
this additional force in the upper stage is the roof loading that
is undetected by the pressure gauges measuring hydraulic
pressure in the bottom stage.
The mechanics of the pressure development in the various
support stages can be described by examination of equilibrium
requirements for each individual stage, realizing that each stage
must carry the same load.  The undetected roof loading with the
bottom stage fully extended can be calculated using equation 4.
An examination of these principles indicates that the period and
magnitude of undetected roof loading will increase as the
setting pressure increases for a particular support.
where URL ' undetected roof load, tons;
A1 ' area of first (bottom) stage, in
2;
A2 ' area of second stage, in
2; and
P1 ' P2 ' setting (pump) pressure, psi.
Figure 26 depicts undetected roof loading for a 700-ton
(two-stage) longwall shield set at full pump pressure.  It is seen
(4)
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Figure 26.–Undetected roof loaded by bottom-stage pressure measurements when bottom
stage is fully extended during setting of the shield.
from this figure that the unrecorded roof loading is quite large.
For example, approximately 200 tons of undetected roof
loading, which represents 84% of the remaining shield
capacity, will occur on the 700-ton longwall after it is set
against the mine roof and floor.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The evolution of improved shield design continues with the
current generation of shield supports.  The previous generation
of shield supports (1985-95 era) experienced several serious
structural failures.  These included canopy sections falling off,
bases cracking in half, leg sockets pushing through the base and
canopy into the mine roof and floor, lemniscate links breaking,
and pins bending and breaking.  Generally, these problems have
been addressed by the support manufacturers.  However, as the
capacities continue to grow, each new generation of shield sup-
ports must also experience the growing pains of design de-
ficiencies.  This is occurring now as isolated failures of modern
shield design are again cropping up.
While proper shield design is not magic, there is an
experience factor that cannot be overlooked.  Unlike designing
a building or a bridge where the load conditions are well known
and fail-safe design philosophies can be readily employed, the
mining environment is not well defined or easily understood.
Mining engineers typically design to allow failure, while con-
ventional structural engineers design to prevent failure.
Furthermore, as the demand for extended shield life continues
to grow, continued improvements in quality control and in-
novations in shield design must be developed if this re-
quirement is to be realized.
Although the design of longwall shields is a complex issue,
it would be beneficial to prospective shield buyers to learn the
basic engineering principles associated with shield design
issues that are addressed in this paper.  Although it is not nec-
essary to know all of the answers, knowing what questions to
ask is important.  Hiring a structural engineering consultant is
another option, but again one must be aware of the uniqueness
of the mining environment and shield design issues.
Corrosion is by far the most overlooked factor in both shield
design and performance testing.  Corrosion control practices are
limited, but they need to be followed.  Simple things such as
using corrosion-resistant paint and repainting of shields can be
effective.  Design changes need to be made to the pin joints and
clevises, which are subjected to high wear rates, to avoid
corrosion in these areas.  Advanced plating technologies and
more corrosive-resistant materials need to be employed to
improve hydraulic cylinder life, which is by far the weak link in
a shield's lifeline.
Support failures are site-specific, and the magnitude of the
problem must be considered in making judgments of support
safety.  The information provided in this paper will help iden-
tify problems and suggest solutions.  However, the final
judgment must be made with considerations of the severity of
the problem, number of supports affected, past performance
history, face conditions at the time of failure, and the overall
situation at the mine site.  Finally, the best policy is always to
correct problems as soon as they occur.  Although this is often
impractical and at times impossible, these generic recom-
mendations regarding safety precautions of problem support
systems are made with the realization that they are not universal
for all circumstances:
1. When failures occur, procedures to reduce shield load
should be implemented.
A good practice to reduce face weighting is to maximize the
rate of advance.  Idle faces generally have a tendency to create
higher shield loads.  Also, setting forces should be optimized.
Conventional wisdom has been to increase the set pressures or
to ensure that full setting (pump) pressure is maintained.  How-
ever, in displacement-controlled loading where the load de-
velopment is proportional to the shield stiffness and the support
resistance is not fully controlling the ground movements,
reducing the setting loads may also be an option to reduce the
total loading on the support.  Another possibility is to reduce
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the depth of the shearer cut.  Much of the shield loading is gen-
erated from the shearer pass.  A reduced cut may reduce shield
loading, although there are no data to substantiate this
hypothesis.
2. Ensure proper operation of the support once it is put into
service.
Another issue related to lowering the design stress is to
ensure proper operation of the support once it is put into service
in the mine.  Stress developments are greatly enhanced when-
ever the support is stood on the toe of the base.  When a shield
is set with the canopy tip up, the leg forces will typically rotate
the canopy into full roof contact and in the process lift the rear
of the base off of the ground.  This base-on-toe configuration
increases the magnitude of stress in the lemniscate links by as
much as 300%.  Modern two-leg shields employ a control sys-
tem for the canopy capsule cylinder that prevents setting the
shield with the canopy tip up.  Thus, if this system is de-
activated by the mine personnel, the life expectancy of the pin
joints and the entire shield can be significantly shortened.
3. Recognize the cumulative effect of degraded performance
and noncatastrophic failures.
As previously discussed, it is quite common for aging
shields to experience hydraulic leaks that lead to degraded
support capacity, but typically do not interfere significantly
with the stability of the support or its capability to remain
functional.  Whenever the degraded support capacity is ac-
companied by a lack of ground control, obviously the problems
must be corrected immediately.  However, with modern high-
capacity supports this is generally not the case, and the question
is how soon the degraded leg cylinder performance should be
corrected.  In many cases, leakage will occur in only one leg or
be considerably worse in one leg compared to the other.  From
a load distribution viewpoint, loads will transfer down the side
of the structure with the active leg.  This imbalance in leg
forces will cause some increase in component stresses, par-
ticularly in the caving shield and lemniscate assembly.  Al-
though this generally will not pose an immediate threat, the
cumulative effect of the increased loading, if left unattended,
will more than likely decrease the shield life by accelerating
fatigue-related failures.  Furthermore, if structural failures do
occur, the asymmetric loading caused by imbalanced leg forces
will likely make these failures more severe.
This same logic applies to structural failures.  There is con-
siderable redundancy built into a shield support in the sense that
there are multiple load paths to transfer roof loading through the
support structure and into the mine floor.  Most failures when
they first occur will not immediately affect the performance of the
support.  However, once a failure initiates, a domino effect will
likely occur wherein additional loading is transferred elsewhere,
and the probability for the failure to grow or spread to other
components as time progresses is also likely.
4. While fatigue failures are difficult to judge, they can lead
to catastrophic failure with little or no warning.  
Modern shields of high-strength steel are more susceptible
to unstable failure than previous generations of shields con-
structed from mild steel.  Crack formation in any part of the
support structure should be viewed as a sign of potentially
imminent danger.  The crack indicates that the steel has failed.
Whether this crack will propagate to cause destruction of a
support component depends on many things, most notably, the
ability of the member to effectively redistribute loading pri-
marily within that component or, to a lesser degree, to other
components.  This makes judgments of support safety in these
situations difficult.  In any event, cracks in a support structure
should be closely monitored, and attention should be given to
any increase in the growth and particularly the rate of growth of
the crack.  Cracks that arrest themselves after formation can
often be ignored, particularly when they are in sections of the
support that do not carry the bulk of the loading.  In this case,
load was adequately transferred elsewhere to alleviate the
localized stress condition that initiated the crack.  Conversely,
a crack that continues to grow after formation is likely to
develop into a critical situation where the safe performance of
the support is threatened.  Obviously, as soon as the structural
integrity of the support (component) is threatened, the support
should be taken out of service and modifications made.  Once
a critical crack length is reached, the growth rate can accelerate
in relatively few additional loading cycles.  Particular attention
should be paid to weldments, since localized stress develop-
ments are likely to be higher in these areas and the potential for
rapid crack growth is enhanced.
5. Recognize failures that can lead to instability and correct
them immediately.
It is unlikely that the support will show any signs of di-
minished load-carrying capability while structural problems are
developing, but the stability of the support may be threatened.
Failures to the caving shield or lemniscate link pins or to the
links themselves are most serious since they control the hori-
zontal stability of the shield.  Failure of any set of link pins or
links will cause the support to collapse under its own weight
from instability.  There is redundancy built into the shield in
that there are pairs (left and right side) of both the upper and
lower links.  Failure of one side may not result in immediate
instability, but will significantly increase loading in the adjacent
link and therefore should be viewed as very serious, with
immediate action taken to remove the failed pin and install a
new one.
Another serious failure that can lead to instability is failure
of the leg sockets.  The leg sockets must transfer loading from
the canopy to the base.  If the sockets break lose, the cylinder
will eventually punch through the bottom plate on the base and
render the support inoperable and perhaps unstable.
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6. Understand the hazards of automated control systems.
During the early development of the electrohydraulic control
systems with automated and shearer-initiated advance, several
injuries occurred because of unplanned or unexpected shield
movements.  Although failures in the electronics have largely
been eliminated in recent years, occasional injuries still occur
where a miner is unaware of the pending shield move, which
was initiated at a remote position by another miner.  Close
attention should be paid to the audible warning of the shield
advance.  A good practice is to walk on the bases of the support
whenever possible to avoid being pinched by an unexpected
shield move.
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